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The explanatory dispensability of idealizations
Baron, Sam
Baron, Sam
Author
Abstract
Enhanced indispensability arguments seek to establish realism about mathematics based on the explanatory role that mathematics plays in science. Idealizations pose a problem for such arguments. Idealizations, in a similar way to mathematics, boost the explanatory credentials of our best scientific theories. And yet, idealizations are not the sorts of things that are supposed to attract a realist attitude. I argue that the explanatory symmetry between idealizations and mathematics can potentially be broken as follows: although idealizations contribute to the explanatory power of our best theories, they do not carry the explanatory load. It is at least open however that mathematics is load-carrying. To give this idea substance, I offer an analysis of what it is to carry the explanatory load in terms of difference-making and counterfactuals.
Keywords
idealization, explanation, indispensability, difference-making, counterfactuals
Date
2016
Type
Journal article
Journal
Synthese
Book
Volume
193
Issue
2
Page Range
365-386
Article Number
ACU Department
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
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Event URL
Open Access Status
License
File Access
Controlled