Personal identity, the casual condition, and the simple view
Matthews, Stephen
Matthews, Stephen
Author
Abstract
Among theories of personal identity over time, the simple view has not been popular among philosophers, but it nevertheless remains the default view among non-philosophers. It may be construed either as the view that nothing grounds a claim of personal identity over time, or that something quite simple (a soul perhaps) is the ground. If the former construal is accepted, a conspicuous difficulty is that the condition of causal dependence between person-stages is absent. But this leaves such a view open to an objection from the failure to provide a condition of individuation. If, on the other hand something like a soul is said to ground personal identity over time, such an account turns out to be more suited to a kind of continuity view.
Keywords
Date
2010
Type
Journal article
Journal
Philosophical Papers
Book
Volume
39
Issue
2
Page Range
183-208
Article Number
ACU Department
Plunkett Centre for Ethics
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy