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Moderate modal skepticism
Strohminger, Margot Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani
Strohminger, Margot
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani
Abstract
This chapter examines moderate modal skepticism, a form of skepticism about metaphysical modality defended by Peter van Inwagen in order to blunt the force of certain modal arguments in the philosophy of religion. Van Inwagen’s argument for moderate modal skepticism assumes Yablo’s (1993) influential world-based epistemology of possibility. This chapter raises two problems for this epistemology of possibility, which undermine van Inwagen’s argument. It then considers how one might motivate moderate modal skepticism by relying on a different epistemology of possibility, which does not face these problems: Williamson’s (2007) counterfactual-based epistemology. Two ways of motivating moderate modal skepticism within that framework are found unpromising. Nevertheless, the chapter also finds a way of vindicating an epistemological thesis that, while weaker than moderate modal skepticism, is strong enough to support the methodological moral van Inwagen wishes to draw.
Keywords
modal skepticism, epistemology of modality, epistemic possibility, skeptical theism, counterfactuals, Peter van Inwagen
Date
2018
Type
Book chapter
Journal
Book
Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology
Volume
Issue
Page Range
302-321
Article Number
ACU Department
School of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry
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Open Access Status
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Controlled