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Rawls, reasonableness, and conscientious objection in health care
Symons, Xavier
Symons, Xavier
Author
Abstract
Much ink has been spilled in recent years over the controversial topic of conscientious objection in health care. In particular, commentators have proposed various ways with which we might distinguish legitimate conscience claims from those that are poorly reasoned or based on prejudice. The aim of this chapter is to argue in favor of the “reasonableness” approach to conscientious objection, viz., the view that we should develop an account of “reasonableness” and “reasonable disagreement” and use this as a way of distinguishing licit and illicit conscience claims. The author discusses Rawls’ account of “reasonableness” and “reasonable disagreement,” and consider how this might guide us in regulating conscientious objection in health care. The author analyzes the “public reason” account offered in Card (2007, 2014), and argue that we should modify Card’s account to include a consensus among regulators about what counts as “basic medical care.” The author suggests that Medical Conscientious Objection Review boards should consider whether conscience-based refusals are based on defensible ethical foundations.
Keywords
abortion, codes of ethics, conscience, ethics, ethics committees, euthanasia, religion
Date
2018
Type
Book chapter
Journal
Book
Applied ethics in the fractured state : Volume 20
Volume
Issue
Page Range
45-54
Article Number
ACU Department
Plunkett Centre for Ethics
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Collections
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Source URL
Event URL
Open Access Status
License
All rights reserved
File Access
Controlled