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A cumulative case argument for infallibilism
Climenhaga, Nevin
Climenhaga, Nevin
Author
Abstract
I present a cumulative case for the thesis that we only know propositions that are certain for us. I argue that this thesis can easily explain the truth of eight plausible claims about knowledge:
There is a qualitative difference between knowledge and non-knowledge.
Knowledge is valuable in a way that non-knowledge is not.
Subjects in Gettier cases do not have knowledge.
If S knows that P, P is part of S’s evidence.
If S knows that P, ~P is epistemically impossible for S.
If S knows that P, S can rationally act as if P.
If S knows that P, S can rationally stop inquiring whether P.
If S knows each of {P1, P2, … P n }, and competently deduces Q from these propositions, S knows that Q.
I then argue that the skeptical costs of this thesis are outweighed by its explanatory power.
Keywords
Date
2021
Type
Book chapter
Journal
Book
Skeptical invariantism reconsidered
Volume
Issue
Page Range
57-79
Article Number
ACU Department
Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
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Open Access Status
License
All rights reserved
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Controlled