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Moral individualism and relationalism: A narrative-style philosophical challenge
Coghlan, Simon
Coghlan, Simon
Author
Abstract
Morally unequal treatment of different nonhuman species, like pigs and dogs, can seem troublingly inconsistent. A position Todd May calls moral individualism and relationalism appears to justify the moral discomfit attending such species-differentiated treatment. Yet some of its basic assumptions are challenged by a philosophical style Roger Scruton called narrative philosophy. Expanding upon Christopher Cordner’s discussion of narrative philosophy, this paper develops a narrative-style philosophical critique of Todd May’s moral individualism and relationalism, especially its reductionist understanding of moral reasons, consistency, and relevance. Such criticism opens up the possibility that the unequal treatment of nonhuman species like pigs and dogs is perfectly consistent and even justified. However, the paper then presents a narrative-style argument that such species-differentiated treatment may be morally inconsistent and unjustified after all.
Keywords
Narrative philosophy, Moral individualism, Relationalism, Nonhuman animals, Moral consistency, Moral relevance, Todd May, Raimond Gaita, Cora Diamond
Date
2016
Type
Journal article
Journal
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Book
Volume
19
Issue
5
Page Range
1241-1257
Article Number
ACU Department
Collections
Relation URI
Source URL
Event URL
Open Access Status
License
File Access
Controlled