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Do reasons and evidence share the same residence?
Littlejohn, Clayton
Littlejohn, Clayton
Author
Abstract
[Extract] It is striking fact that so many good people know to do the things that should be done even when they know very little about what ultimately makes these things the things to do.1 They know to call their parents (but not something insulting) and to feed their children (but not to tigers) without the benefit of the theoretical understanding they'd pick up in an ideal ethical theory class. How could this be?
Star suggests that this is largely down to two things. First, these good people are the good people because they are appropriately responsive to normative reasons (2015: 97). These agents are moved by good reasons, albeit derivative reasons that are distinct from the fundamental reasons that would figure in the right theory of the right. These derivative reasons reliably lead these agents to do the right thing because their status as reasons ensures that they are evidence that these agents ought to perform the relevant acts. Thus, while the good folk might not act for the reasons that figure in good theories of right action, it isn't an accident that they act as these theories tell us they ought to.
Keywords
Date
2016
Type
Journal article
Journal
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Book
Volume
93
Issue
3
Page Range
720-727
Article Number
ACU Department
Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
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Open Access Status
License
All rights reserved
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Controlled