Loading...
A new problem for the linguistic doctrine of necessary truth
Russell, Gillian
Russell, Gillian
Author
Abstract
My target in this chapter is a view that has sometimes been called the ‘Linguistic Doctrine of Necessary Truth’ (L-DoNT) and sometimes ‘Conventionalism about Necessity’.1 It is the view that necessity is grounded in the meanings of our expressions—meanings which are sometimes identified with the conventions governing those expressions—and that our knowledge of that necessity is based on our knowledge of those meanings or conventions. In its simplest form the view states that a truth, if it is necessary, is necessary (and knowably necessary) because it is analytic.
Keywords
natural kind, contingent proposition, logical truth, true proposition, modal phenomenon
Date
2010
Type
Book chapter
Journal
Book
New waves in truth
Volume
Issue
Page Range
267-281
Article Number
ACU Department
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Collections
Relation URI
Source URL
Event URL
Open Access Status
License
All rights reserved
File Access
Controlled