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Methods, methodology, and moral judgement: Sidgwick on the nature of ethics

Crisp, Roger
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Crisp, Roger
Abstract
This paper is an attempt to explain and criticize Sidgwick’s views on the nature of ethics and normativity. It begins by comparing his distinction between juridical and teleological conceptions of ethics, before moving on to Sidgwick’s conception of the practicality of ethics. The methodological issues behind Sidgwick’s decision to restrict his argument to just three methods are examined, before a discussion of Sidgwick’s position on the autonomy of ethics, the notion of ‘ought’, and moral motivation.
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Date
2013
Type
Journal article
Journal
Revue Internationale de Philosophie
Book
Volume
2013/4
Issue
266
Page Range
397-419
Article Number
ACU Department
Collections
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy - General
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14802/2007
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https://www.cairn-int.info/article.php?ID_ARTICLE=E_RIP_266_0397&DocId=63644&hits=11084+11083+11082+11081+11080+11079+11078+11077+11075+11074+11+10+9+8+7+6+5+4+2+1+
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