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From the executive suite to the environment : How does CEO power affect climate change disclosures?
Bose, Sudipta Boubaker, Sabri Daradkeh, Hussein Shams, Syed
Bose, Sudipta
Boubaker, Sabri
Daradkeh, Hussein
Shams, Syed
Abstract
This study examines the relationship between CEO power and corporate climate change disclosure and the moderating role of internal and external monitoring in this relationship. Using a sample of 3,512 United States firm-year observations, we find that firms with more powerful CEOs disclose less climate change information. However, this negative relationship is mitigated in firms with higher institutional ownership, greater financial analyst coverage, and stronger internal governance. Our results remain robust across a series of tests designed to address both observable and unobservable selection biases, as well as omitted variable biases. Further analysis reveals that reduced firm-level transparency is an underlying channel through which CEO power diminishes climate change disclosures. Additionally, we document that climate change disclosure acts as an underlying mechanism linking CEO power to firm value. The findings of our study have important implications for regulators, policymakers, researchers, investors, analysts, and company management, especially in the context of increasing regulatory pressure on firms to enhance their climate change disclosures.
Keywords
CEO power, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), climate change disclosures, institutional investors, financial analysts, governance, firm value
Date
2025
Type
Journal article
Journal
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
Book
Volume
100
Issue
Page Range
1-28
Article Number
Article 102140
ACU Department
Peter Faber Business School
Faculty of Law and Business
Faculty of Law and Business
Collections
Relation URI
Source URL
Event URL
Open Access Status
Published as ‘gold’ (paid) open access
License
CC BY 4.0
File Access
Open
Notes
© 2025 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).