All rights reservedBolinger, Renée Jorgensen2025-10-1620202021-07-080020-174X10.1080/0020174X.2020.1850336https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14802/2443The problem of moral disagreement has been presented as an objection to contextualist semantics for ‘ought’, since it is not clear that contextualism can accommodate or give a convincing gloss of such disagreement. I argue that independently of our semantics, disagreements over ‘ought’ in non-cooperative contexts are best understood as indirect metalinguistic disputes, which is easily accommodated by contextualism. If this is correct, then rather than posing a problem for contextualism, the data from moral disagreements provides some reason to adopt a semantics that allows contextual variance in the meanings of ‘ought’.metalinguistic negationdeontic modalscontextualismdisagreementmetalinguistic denialJournal article2-s2.0-85097069301ControlledPUB0201082850