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The pragmatics of normative disagreement
Finlay, Stephen
Finlay, Stephen
Author
Abstract
[Extract] On their surface, moral and normative sentences appear descriptive. But what kinds of facts could they describe? Many have been drawn to the idea that normative words like ‘ought’ and ‘good’ are used to refer to relational properties, consisting in a relation to something like a standard, rule, desire, or end, which can vary between contexts. On my preferred view, to say that s ought to φ is
roughly to assert the proposition that some implicit end, e, is more likely to obtain if s φs than if s does anything else instead.
Keywords
Date
2014
Type
Book chapter
Journal
Book
Having it Both Ways : Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics
Volume
Issue
Page Range
124-148
Article Number
ACU Department
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
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Open Access Status
License
All rights reserved
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Controlled
Notes
© Oxford University Press 2014 All rights reserved.