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Non-naturalistic moral explanation
Baron, Samuel Colyvan, Mark Miller, Kristie Rubin, Michael
Baron, Samuel
Colyvan, Mark
Miller, Kristie
Rubin, Michael
Abstract
It has seemed, to many, that there is an important connection between the ways in which some theoretical posits explain our observations, and our reasons for being ontologically committed to those posits. One way to spell out this connection is in terms of what has become known as the explanatory criterion of ontological commitment. This is, roughly, the view that we ought to posit only those entities that are indispensable to our best explanations. Our primary aim is to argue that the moral nonnaturalist places herself in an invidious position if she simply accepts that the nonnatural moral facts that she posits are not explanatory. Instead, we offer the nonnaturalist an alternative strategy for dealing with moral explanations. The strategy is to retain the explanatory criterion of ontological commitment and maintain that moral properties are, in fact, explanatory. The explanations they provide are not causal explanations; instead, moral properties make a non-causal difference to the physical facts.
Keywords
explanation, causal explanation, non-causal explanation, moral naturalism, moral non-naturalism, mathematical realism, indispensability arguments
Date
2019
Type
Journal article
Journal
Synthese
Book
Volume
Issue
Page Range
1-22
Article Number
ACU Department
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Collections
Relation URI
Source URL
Event URL
Open Access Status
License
All rights reserved
File Access
Controlled