Loading...
How to prove Hume’s Law
Russell, Gillian
Russell, Gillian
Author
Abstract
This paper proves a precisification of Hume’s Law—the thesis that one cannot get an ought from an is—as an instance of a more general theorem which establishes several other philosophically interesting, though less controversial, barriers to logical consequence.
Keywords
Hume’s Law, barriers to entailment, philosophical logic, invalidity, logical consequence
Date
2022
Type
Journal article
Journal
Journal of Philosophical Logic
Book
Volume
51
Issue
Page Range
603-632
Article Number
ACU Department
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Collections
Files
Relation URI
Source URL
Event URL
Open Access Status
Published as ‘gold’ (paid) open access
License
CC BY 4.0
File Access
Open