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Intensionalism and propositional attitudes
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani Hawthorne, John
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani
Hawthorne, John
Abstract
This chapter explores solutions to a somewhat underappreciated family of puzzles concerning propositional attitudes generated by intensionalism—the view that necessarily equivalent propositions are identical. After presenting the puzzles informally, the chapter introduces the apparatus of higher-order logic, which allows one to quantify into the position of any type of expression, and makes possible a formally rigorous statement of the puzzles. Many philosophers will think that it’s quite obvious how one should respond to the puzzles—namely by treating them as refutations of intensionalism. But this response is arguably too quick. The chapter explores strategies for responding to the puzzles within the framework of intensionalism, laying out a taxonomy of such strategies. Certain of these strategies treat English attitude sentences as opaque and others don’t. However all of them use a transparent (i.e. non-opaque) language as the vehicle for theorizing. The focus here will be on the logical ramifications of the various strategies.
Keywords
propositional attitudes, mental content, propositions, intensionalism, higher-order logic
Date
2022
Type
Book chapter
Journal
Book
Oxford studies in philosophy of mind ; volume 2
Volume
Issue
Page Range
114-174
Article Number
ACU Department
Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
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Open Access Status
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All rights reserved
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