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Collectives' and individuals' obligations: A parity argument
Collins, Stephanie Lawford-Smith, Holly
Collins, Stephanie
Lawford-Smith, Holly
Abstract
Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do. We argue for parity on both counts.
Keywords
Collective obligation, collective responsibility, individual obligation, group agency, demandingness, promises, wrongdoing, benefit, beneficence, associative obligation
Date
2016
Type
Journal article
Journal
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Book
Volume
46
Issue
1
Page Range
38-58
Article Number
ACU Department
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Collections
Relation URI
Source URL
Event URL
Open Access Status
License
File Access
Controlled