Loading...
Groundless truth
Baron, Sam Miller, Kristie Norton, James
Baron, Sam
Miller, Kristie
Norton, James
Abstract
We defend two claims: (1) if one is attracted to a strong non-maximalist view about truthmaking, then it is natural to construe this as the view that there exist fundamental truths; (2) despite considerable aversion to fundamental truths, there is as yet no viable independent argument against them. That is, there is no argument against the existence of fundamental truths that is independent of any more specific arguments against the ontology accepted by the strong non-maximalist. Thus there is no argument that the strong non-maximalist herself will find dialectically motivating.
Keywords
Date
2014
Type
Journal article
Journal
Inquiry
Book
Volume
57
Issue
2
Page Range
175-195
Article Number
ACU Department
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Collections
Relation URI
Source URL
Event URL
Open Access Status
License
File Access
Controlled