Loading...
An Epistemology for Moral Naturalists
Perl, Caleb Herman
Perl, Caleb Herman
Author
Abstract
This chapter introduces a new account of moral knowledge—an account of how we make or assess claims to moral knowledge. It explains three hallmarks of moral knowledge: its apriori nature, its autonomy from scientific inquiry, and its minimalist epistemology. These hallmarks all seem like evidence against moral naturalists. The chapter shows that this new account allows moral naturalists to capture all three hallmarks. Capturing the three hallmarks undercuts a central source of evidence against moral naturalism.
Keywords
moral naturalism, moral knowledge, moral epistemology, contextualism, presupposition, apriori
Date
2022
Type
Book chapter
Journal
Book
Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 17
Volume
Issue
Page Range
166-196
Article Number
ACU Department
School of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Collections
Relation URI
Event URL
Open Access Status
License
All rights reserved
File Access
Controlled
Notes
© Caleb Perl, 2022.
