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No one can serve two epistemic masters
Gallow, J. Dmitri
Gallow, J. Dmitri
Author
Abstract
Consider two epistemic experts—for concreteness, let them be two weather forecasters. Suppose that you aren’t certain that they will issue identical forecasts, and you would like to proportion your degrees of belief to theirs in the following way: first, conditional on either’s forecast of rain being x, you’d like your own degree of belief in rain to be x. Secondly, conditional on them issuing different forecasts of rain, you’d like your own degree of belief in rain to be some weighted average of the forecast of each (perhaps with weights determined by their prior reliability). Finally, you’d like your degrees of belief to be given by an orthodox probability measure. Moderate ambitions, all. But you can’t always get what you want.
Keywords
expert deference, disagreement, linear averaging
Date
2018
Type
Journal article
Journal
Philosophical Studies
Book
Volume
175
Issue
10
Page Range
2389-2398
Article Number
ACU Department
Collections
Relation URI
Source URL
Event URL
Open Access Status
License
File Access
Controlled