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On a new logical problem of evil
Gellman, Jerome
Gellman, Jerome
Author
Abstract
J. L. Schellenberg has formulated two versions of a new logical argument from evil, an argument he claims to be immune to Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense. The first version assumes that God created the world to model God’s goodness, and the second to share with the world the good that already existed. In either case, the good of the world, like that of God, should not require or allow any evil. I argue that the new argument, if correct, would pay a heavy price to avoid the free will defense. I then go on to show that neither version of the argument is sound. So, there is no new problem of evil.
Keywords
Date
2015
Type
Journal article
Journal
Faith and Philosophy
Book
Volume
32
Issue
4
Page Range
439-452
Article Number
ACU Department
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Open Access Status
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