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Rational disagreement as a challenge to practical ethics and moral theory: An essay in moral epistemology
Audi, Robert
Audi, Robert
Author
Abstract
Moral disagreement — roughly, disagreement about what is right or wrong — is widely considered to be both common and sufficiently resistant to rational resolution to constitute a challenge to the objectivity of ethics. This chapter distinguishes the kinds of disagreement in a way that is crucial for properly appraising both the extent and the epistemological significance of moral disagreement. It argues that certain kinds of disagreement are compatible not only with the objectivity of ethics but also with the self-evidence of a certain kind of moral principle.
Keywords
moral disagreement, ethics, moral principles, dogmatism
Date
2008
Type
Book chapter
Journal
Book
Epistemology: New Essays
Volume
Issue
Page Range
225-247
Article Number
ACU Department
Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
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Open Access Status
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Controlled