Loading...
Dignity, being and becoming in research ethics
Kirchhoffer, David G.
Kirchhoffer, David G.
Author
Abstract
Since the end of World War II, most guidelines governing human research seem to have relied on the principle of respect for autonomy as a key, though not sole, criterion in assessing the moral validity of research involving human participants.1 One explanation for this apparent reliance on respect for autonomy may be that respect for autonomy, made effective through the practice of obtaining informed consent, functions as a useful proxy when dealing with competent adults for the more complex principle of respect for human dignity that underpins much of the moral discourse in this area. If this explanation holds, then assessment of the moral licitness of research involving human individuals whose autonomy is limited in some way requires a deeper analysis of the ‘thicker’ concepts of human dignity, since we cannot rely on respect for autonomy to do the work of respect for human dignity where autonomy (understood as a capacity to consent based on adequate information) is not present, is limited or is compromised.
Keywords
dignity, informed consent, research ethics, medical ethics
Date
2019
Type
Book chapter
Journal
Book
Beyond autonomy : Limits and alternatives to informed consent in research ethics and law
Volume
Issue
Page Range
117-132
Article Number
ACU Department
Queensland Bioethics Centre
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Collections
Relation URI
Source URL
Event URL
Open Access Status
License
All rights reserved
File Access
Open
Notes
This material has been published in Beyond Autonomy: Limits and alternatives to informed consent in research ethics and law by Kirchhoffer, David G.; Richards, Bernadette
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108649247.008
This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution or re-use. © Cambridge University Press 2019