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Skeptical thoughts concerning explanationism and skepticism
Littlejohn, Clayton
Littlejohn, Clayton
Author
Abstract
According to the explanationist, we can rely on inference to best explanation to justifiably believe familiar skeptical hypotheses are false. On this view, commonsense beliefs about the existence and character of familiar, medium-sized dry goods provides the best explanation of our evidence and so justifies our belief that we're not brains-in-vats. This explanationist approach seems prima facie plausible until we press the explanationist to tell us what the data is that we're trying to explain by appeal to our beliefs about external objects and how we could have access to it.
Keywords
dogmatism, evidence, explanationism, inference to best explanation, knowledge, skepticism
Date
2014
Type
Journal article
Journal
Symposion
Book
Volume
1
Issue
1
Page Range
77-87
Article Number
ACU Department
Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Collections
Relation URI
Source URL
Event URL
Open Access Status
Open access
License
All rights reserved
File Access
Controlled
Notes
Bronze open access.