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Defining normativity
Finlay, Stephen
Finlay, Stephen
Author
Abstract
This chapter aims to clarify debate over the nature, existence, extension, and analyzability of normativity, by investigating whether different philosophers’ claims are about the same subject or (as argued by Derek Parfit) they are using the terms ‘normative’ and ‘normativity’ with different meanings. While it is suggested that the term may be multiply ambiguous, reasons are identified for optimism about a common subject-matter for metanormative theory. This is supported by sketching a special hybrid view of normative judgment, perspectivism, that occupies a position between cognitivism and noncognitivism, naturalism and nonnaturalism, objectivism and subjectivism. Three main fissures are explored: between (i) the “normativity” of language/thought versus that of facts and properties, (ii) abstract versus substantive normativity, and (iii) formal versus robust normativity.
Keywords
definition of normativity, cognitivism, noncognitivism, formal normativity, robust normativity, Derek Parfit, metanormative theory, perspectivism, hybrid theory
Date
2019
Type
Book chapter
Journal
Book
Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence
Volume
Issue
Page Range
187-219
Article Number
ACU Department
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
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Open Access Status
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Controlled