Rescuing Companions in Guilt Arguments

Journal article

Cosker-Rowland, Rach. (2016). Rescuing Companions in Guilt Arguments. The Philosophical Quarterly. 66(262), pp. 161 - 171. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv070
AuthorsCosker-Rowland, Rach
Abstract

Christopher Cowie has recently argued that companions in guilt arguments against the moral error theory that appeal to epistemic reasons cannot work. I show that such companions in guilt arguments can work if, as we have good reason to believe, moral reasons and epistemic reasons are instances of fundamentally the same relation.

Year2016
JournalThe Philosophical Quarterly
Journal citation66 (262), pp. 161 - 171
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv070
Page range161 - 171
Research GroupInstitute for Religion and Critical Inquiry
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File Access Level
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