The intelligibility of moral intransigence: A dilemma for cognitivism about moral judgment

Journal article


Rowland, Richard. (2018). The intelligibility of moral intransigence: A dilemma for cognitivism about moral judgment. Analysis. 78(2), pp. 266 - 275. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx140
AuthorsRowland, Richard
Abstract

Many have argued that various features of moral disagreements create problems for cognitivism about moral judgment, but these arguments have been shown to fail. In this paper, I articulate a new problem for cognitivism that derives from features of our responses to moral disagreement. I argue that cognitivism entails that one of the following two claims is false: (1) a mental state is a belief only if it tracks changes in perceived evidence; (2) it is intelligible to make moral judgments that do not track changes in perceived evidence. I explain that there is a good case that (1) holds such that we should prefer theories that do not entail the negation of (1). And I argue that the seeming intelligibility of entirely intransigent responses to peer disagreement about moral issues shows us that there is a good case that (2) holds.

Year2018
JournalAnalysis
Journal citation78 (2), pp. 266 - 275
PublisherOxford Journals
ISSN0003-2638
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx140
Scopus EID2-s2.0-85048692584
Page range266 - 275
Research GroupInstitute for Religion and Critical Inquiry
Publisher's version
File Access Level
Controlled
Place of publicationUnited Kingdom
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