No one can serve two epistemic masters
Journal article
Gallow, J. Dmitri. (2018). No one can serve two epistemic masters. Philosophical Studies. 175(10), pp. 2389 - 2398. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0964-8
Authors | Gallow, J. Dmitri |
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Abstract | Consider two epistemic experts—for concreteness, let them be two weather forecasters. Suppose that you aren’t certain that they will issue identical forecasts, and you would like to proportion your degrees of belief to theirs in the following way: first, conditional on either’s forecast of rain being x, you’d like your own degree of belief in rain to be x. Secondly, conditional on them issuing different forecasts of rain, you’d like your own degree of belief in rain to be some weighted average of the forecast of each (perhaps with weights determined by their prior reliability). Finally, you’d like your degrees of belief to be given by an orthodox probability measure. Moderate ambitions, all. But you can’t always get what you want. |
Keywords | expert deference; disagreement; linear averaging |
Year | 2018 |
Journal | Philosophical Studies |
Journal citation | 175 (10), pp. 2389 - 2398 |
Publisher | Springer Netherlands |
ISSN | 0031-8116 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0964-8 |
Scopus EID | 2-s2.0-85027707488 |
Page range | 2389 - 2398 |
Research Group | Dianoia Institute of Philosophy |
Publisher's version | File Access Level Controlled |
Place of publication | Netherlands |
https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/88wz7/no-one-can-serve-two-epistemic-masters
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