Revisiting the right to do wrong

Journal article


Bolinger, Renee Jorgensen 2017. Revisiting the right to do wrong. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 95 (1), pp. 43 - 57. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1179654
AuthorsBolinger, Renee Jorgensen
Abstract

Rights to do wrong are not necessary even within the framework of interest-based rights aimed at preserving autonomy (contra Waldron, Enoch, and Herstein). Agents can make morally significant choices and develop their moral character without a right to do wrong, so long as we allow that there can be moral variation within the set of actions that an agent is permitted to perform. Agents can also engage in non-trivial self-constitution in choosing between morally indifferent options, so long as there is adequate non-moral variation among the alternatives. The stubborn intuition that individuals have a right to do wrong in some cases can be explained as stemming from a cautionary principle motivated by the asymmetry between the risk of wrongly interfering and that of refraining from interfering.

Keywordsrights; moral theory; right to do wrong
Year2017
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Journal citation95 (1), pp. 43 - 57
PublisherRoutledge
ISSN0004-8402
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1179654
Scopus EID2-s2.0-84965028352
Page range43 - 57
Research GroupDianoia Institute of Philosophy
Place of publicationUnited Kingdom
Permalink -

https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/88x42/revisiting-the-right-to-do-wrong

Restricted files

Publisher's version

  • 0
    total views
  • 0
    total downloads
  • 0
    views this month
  • 0
    downloads this month

Export as