Revisiting the right to do wrong
Journal article
Bolinger, Renee Jorgensen. (2017). Revisiting the right to do wrong. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 95(1), pp. 43 - 57. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1179654
Authors | Bolinger, Renee Jorgensen |
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Abstract | Rights to do wrong are not necessary even within the framework of interest-based rights aimed at preserving autonomy (contra Waldron, Enoch, and Herstein). Agents can make morally significant choices and develop their moral character without a right to do wrong, so long as we allow that there can be moral variation within the set of actions that an agent is permitted to perform. Agents can also engage in non-trivial self-constitution in choosing between morally indifferent options, so long as there is adequate non-moral variation among the alternatives. The stubborn intuition that individuals have a right to do wrong in some cases can be explained as stemming from a cautionary principle motivated by the asymmetry between the risk of wrongly interfering and that of refraining from interfering. |
Keywords | rights; moral theory; right to do wrong |
Year | 2017 |
Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
Journal citation | 95 (1), pp. 43 - 57 |
Publisher | Routledge |
ISSN | 0004-8402 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1179654 |
Scopus EID | 2-s2.0-84965028352 |
Page range | 43 - 57 |
Research Group | Dianoia Institute of Philosophy |
Publisher's version | File Access Level Controlled |
Place of publication | United Kingdom |
https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/88x42/revisiting-the-right-to-do-wrong
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