Reasons or fittingness first?

Journal article

Rowland, Richard. (2017). Reasons or fittingness first? Ethics: an international journal of social, political, and legal philosophy. 128(1), pp. 212 - 229. https://doi.org/10.1086/692949
AuthorsRowland, Richard
Abstract

Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that we should put fittingness rather than reasons first because we can provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative only if we put fittingness rather than reasons first. I argue that it is no more difficult to provide an account of the evaluative in terms of the normative if we put reasons rather than fittingness first.

Year2017
JournalEthics: an international journal of social, political, and legal philosophy
Journal citation128 (1), pp. 212 - 229
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press
ISSN0014-1704
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1086/692949
Open accessOpen access
Page range212 - 229
Research GroupInstitute for Religion and Critical Inquiry
Publisher's version
Place of publicationUnited States of America
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