Companions in guilt arguments in the epistemology of moral disagreement

Our epistemic peers about whether p are our epistemic equals about whether p; more specifically, they are those who are just as reliable as we are about whether p or just as likely to be right about whether p as we are. Suppose I’m playing a game of street hockey with some friends. We’re all epistemic peers about what the score is. The philosophers with whom I went to grad school are my epistemic peers about any randomly chosen question about contemporary philosophy or the history of philosophy. Suppose I’m stood outside at a street party. Everyone around me is my epistemic peer about whether it is currently raining.

© 2020 selection and editorial matter, Christopher Cowie and Rach Cosker-Rowland; individual chapters, the contributors

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