Companions in guilt arguments in the epistemology of moral disagreement
Book chapter
Rowland, Richard Alan. (2020). Companions in guilt arguments in the epistemology of moral disagreement. In In Cowie, Christopher and Rowland, R. (Ed.). Companions in Guilt: Arguments in Metaethics pp. 187 Routledge.
Authors | Rowland, Richard Alan |
---|---|
Editors | Cowie, Christopher and Rowland, R. |
Abstract | Our epistemic peers about whether p are our epistemic equals about whether p; more specifically, they are those who are just as reliable as we are about whether p or just as likely to be right about whether p as we are. Suppose I’m playing a game of street hockey with some friends. We’re all epistemic peers about what the score is. The philosophers with whom I went to grad school are my epistemic peers about any randomly chosen question about contemporary philosophy or the history of philosophy. Suppose I’m stood outside at a street party. Everyone around me is my epistemic peer about whether it is currently raining. |
Keywords | epistemology; philosophy; morals; disagreement; arguments; guilt; metaethics |
Page range | 187 |
205 | |
Year | 01 Jan 2020 |
Book title | Companions in Guilt: Arguments in Metaethics |
Publisher | Routledge |
Place of publication | United States |
Edition | 1st |
ISBN | 978-0-429-45467-7 |
Web address (URL) | https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429454677-16/companions-guilt-arguments-epistemology-moral-disagreement-rach-cosker-rowland?context=ubx&refId=54453140-60a7-4ff6-aa19-a00c4aad924c |
Open access | Published as non-open access |
Research or scholarly | Research |
Publisher's version | License All rights reserved File Access Level Controlled |
Output status | Published |
Publication dates | |
2019 | |
Online | 14 Oct 2019 |
Publication process dates | |
Deposited | 06 Aug 2024 |
Additional information | © 2020 selection and editorial matter, Christopher Cowie and Rach Cosker-Rowland; individual chapters, the contributors |
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. |
https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/90w20/companions-in-guilt-arguments-in-the-epistemology-of-moral-disagreement
Restricted files
Publisher's version
3
total views0
total downloads0
views this month0
downloads this month