Heidegger and Ricoeur on ipseity

It is common to read that Heidegger in Being and Time and Ricœur in Oneself as Another both developed a conception of “the self.” This chapter attempts to show why this commonly held assumption is misguided. Albeit with different emphases, both Heidegger and Ricœur advanced an original concept that was completely distinct in its “economy” from “the ego” of Descartes or “the self” of Locke. This concept of Selbstheit (translated into French as ipséité) refers first of all to a “way of being,” to an existential attitude of truth and faithfulness in one’s own existence. Therefore, ipseity is less to do with questions of numerical identity through time (that privileged by Locke and his followers) than with qualitative identity towards which we bear a responsibility before others.

© 2024 selection and editorial matter Burt C. Hopkins and Daniele De Santis; individual chapters, the contributors. All rights reserved.