Can It Be Irrational to Knowingly Choose the Best?

Journal article

Spencer, Jack. (2023). Can It Be Irrational to Knowingly Choose the Best? Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 101(1), pp. 128-139. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1958880
AuthorsSpencer, Jack
Abstract

Seeking a decision theory that can handle both the Newcomb problems that challenge evidential decision theory and the unstable problems that challenge causal decision theory, some philosophers recently have turned to ‘graded ratifiability’. However, the graded ratifiability approach to decision theory is, despite its virtues, unsatisfactory; for it conflicts with the platitude that it is always rationally permissible for an agent to knowingly choose their best option.

Keywordsdecision theory; Newcomb’s Problem; rationality; knowledge
Year01 Jan 2023
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Journal citation101 (1), pp. 128-139
PublisherRoutledge
ISSN1471-6828
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1958880
Web address (URL)https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2021.1958880
Open accessPublished as non-open access
Research or scholarlyResearch
Page range128-139
Publisher's version
License
All rights reserved
File Access Level
Controlled
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Print29 Jul 2021
Publication process dates
Accepted09 Jul 2021
Deposited04 Oct 2024
Additional information

© 2021 Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Place of publicationUnited Kingdom
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