Three models of phenomenal unity
Koksvik, Ole 2014. Three models of phenomenal unity. Journal of Consciousness Studies: controversies in science and the humanities. 21 (7-8), pp. 105 - 131.
There is something it is like for me to hear a seagull crying, something it is like to see a boat in the distance, and something it is like to suffer a slight headache. Each of these local conscious experiences have their own phenomenal character. The experiences are phenomenally unified just in case there is also something it is like to enjoy these and all the other local experiences I have at the relevant time together. For there is also something it is like to be me overall: my global conscious experience has a phenomenal character. But what is it like to be me overall? What is the relationship between the phenomenal characters of local experiences and the phenomenal character of the global experience to which they contribute? This paper argues that our concepts of local and global conscious experiences allow for three completely different conceptions of how the former combine into the latter. It also argues that this shows that our concepts of local conscious experiences, global conscious experiences, and of their relationship are much more permissive than we might have thought.
|Journal||Journal of Consciousness Studies: controversies in science and the humanities|
|Journal citation||21 (7-8), pp. 105 - 131|
|Web address (URL)||https://ingentaconnect.com/contentone/imp/jcs/2014/00000021/f0020007/art00006|
|Page range||105 - 131|
|Research Group||Dianoia Institute of Philosophy|
|Place of publication||United Kingdom|
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