Phenomenal contrast: A critique
Koksvik, Ole. (2015) Phenomenal contrast: A critique. American Philosophical Quarterly. 52(4), pp. 321 - 334.
A fundamental obstacle to understanding conscious experience is the lack of authoritative methods for determining what the character of a given experience is. Recently, an optimistic consensus has begun to arise, according to which phenomenal contrast arguments can provide answers. This paper argues that important facts about human mental lives systematically block a large class of uses of phenomenal contrast from achieving their aim, and that these minimal pair arguments therefore fail, quite generally.
|Journal||American Philosophical Quarterly|
|Journal citation||52 (4), pp. 321 - 334|
|Publisher||University of Illinois Press|
|Web address (URL)||https://www.jstor.org/stable/24475423|
|Page range||321 - 334|
|Research Group||Dianoia Institute of Philosophy|
File Access Level
|Place of publication||United States of America|
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