Phenomenal contrast: A critique

Journal article


Koksvik, Ole. (2015). Phenomenal contrast: A critique. American Philosophical Quarterly. 52(4), pp. 321 - 334.
AuthorsKoksvik, Ole
Abstract

A fundamental obstacle to understanding conscious experience is the lack of authoritative methods for determining what the character of a given experience is. Recently, an optimistic consensus has begun to arise, according to which phenomenal contrast arguments can provide answers. This paper argues that important facts about human mental lives systematically block a large class of uses of phenomenal contrast from achieving their aim, and that these minimal pair arguments therefore fail, quite generally.

Year2015
JournalAmerican Philosophical Quarterly
Journal citation52 (4), pp. 321 - 334
PublisherUniversity of Illinois Press
ISSN0003-0481
Web address (URL)https://www.jstor.org/stable/24475423
Page range321 - 334
Research GroupDianoia Institute of Philosophy
Publisher's version
File Access Level
Controlled
Place of publicationUnited States of America
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https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/8v04x/phenomenal-contrast-a-critique

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