On a new logical problem of evil

Journal article


Gellman, Jerome 2015. On a new logical problem of evil. Faith and Philosophy. 32 (4), pp. 439 - 452. https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil201592144
AuthorsGellman, Jerome
Abstract

J. L. Schellenberg has formulated two versions of a new logical argument from evil, an argument he claims to be immune to Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense. The first version assumes that God created the world to model God’s goodness, and the second to share with the world the good that already existed. In either case, the good of the world, like that of God, should not require or allow any evil. I argue that the new argument, if correct, would pay a heavy price to avoid the free will defense. I then go on to show that neither version of the argument is sound. So, there is no new problem of evil.

Year2015
JournalFaith and Philosophy
Journal citation32 (4), pp. 439 - 452
ISSN0739-7046
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil201592144
Page range439 - 452
Research GroupSchool of Theology
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https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/887v9/on-a-new-logical-problem-of-evil

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