Indifference to anti-humean chances

Journal article


Gallow, J. Dmitri. (2022). Indifference to anti-humean chances. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 52(5), pp. 485-501. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.36
AuthorsGallow, J. Dmitri
Abstract

An indifference principle says that your credences should be distributed uniformly over each of the possibilities you recognise. A chance deference principle says that your credences should be aligned with the chances. My thesis is that if we are anti-Humeans about chance, then these two principles are incompatible. Anti-Humeans think that it is possible for the actual frequencies to depart from the chances. As long as you recognise possibilities like this, you cannot both spread your credences evenly and defer to the chances. I discuss some weaker forms of indifference which will allow anti-Humeans to defer to the chances.

KeywordsHumeanism; chance; indifference; chance deference; principal principle; principle of indifference
Year2022
JournalCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Journal citation52 (5), pp. 485-501
PublisherCambridge University Press
ISSN0045-5091
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.36
Scopus EID2-s2.0-85149994733
Open accessPublished as ‘gold’ (paid) open access
Page range485-501
Publisher's version
License
File Access Level
Open
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online10 Mar 2023
Publication process dates
Deposited23 May 2023
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