Must egalitarians condemn representative democracy?

Journal article


Lovett, Adam. (2021). Must egalitarians condemn representative democracy? Social Theory and Practice: an international and interdisciplinary journal of social philosophy. 47(1), pp. 171-198. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract202121116
AuthorsLovett, Adam
Abstract

Many contemporary democratic theorists are democratic egalitarians. They think that the distinctive value of democracy lies in equality. Yet this position faces a serious problem. All contemporary democracies are representative democracies. Such democracies are highly unequal: representatives have much more power than do ordinary citizens. So, it seems that democratic egalitarians must condemn representative democracies. In this paper, I present a solution to this problem. My solution invokes popular control. If representatives are under popular control, then their extra power is not objectionable. Unfortunately, so I argue, in the United States representatives are under loose popular control.

Keywordsdemocratic equality; popular control; relational egalitarianism; representation; representative democracy
Year01 Jan 2021
JournalSocial Theory and Practice: an international and interdisciplinary journal of social philosophy
Journal citation47 (1), pp. 171-198
PublisherFlorida State University
ISSN0037-802X
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract202121116
Web address (URL)https://www.pdcnet.org/soctheorpract/content/soctheorpract_2021_0047_0001_0171_0198
Open accessPublished as non-open access
Research or scholarlyResearch
Page range171-198
Publisher's version
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All rights reserved
File Access Level
Controlled
Output statusPublished
Publication process dates
Deposited03 Sep 2024
Additional information

© Copyright by Social Theory and Practice

Place of publicationUnited States
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