Prudential and moral reasons
Book chapter
Crisp, Roger. (2018). Prudential and moral reasons. In In K. Bennett and D. Zimmerman (Ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity pp. 800 - 820 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.35
Authors | Crisp, Roger |
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Editors | K. Bennett and D. Zimmerman |
Abstract | This chapter concerns the relation between prudential (“self-regarding” or “self-interested”) reasons and moral reasons. It begins with definitions of these types of reasons, arguing that moral reasons be understood as those described in ineliminably moral terminology, before moving on to central current views on reasons, well-being, and what makes actions right or wrong. Forms of egoism are distinguished and some objections to normative egoism answered. Views egoists might take on morality are then discussed, including that of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic. The following section covers impartial views, including the extreme form found in utilitarianism. The chapter then outlines the range of “dualistic” positions available, in which reasons are grounded both in the good of the agent and in morality. It concludes with discussion of some recent work on the relation of prudential and moral reasons. |
Keywords | self-interest; morality; demandingness; egoism; impartialism |
Page range | 800 - 820 |
Year | 2018 |
Book title | The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Place of publication | United Kingdom |
ISBN | 9780199657889 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.35 |
Scopus EID | 2-s2.0-85059501458 |
Research Group | Dianoia Institute of Philosophy |
Publisher's version | File Access Level Controlled |
https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/8q528/prudential-and-moral-reasons
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