Life and finite individuality : Revisiting a debate in British idealism

In July 1918, a debate took place in London, organised by the Aristotelian Society, between the two leading camps in British philosophy: personal idealism, headed by Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, and absolute idealism, led by Bernard Bosanquet. In this chapter, Trakakis argues that this exchange, though long forgotten, remains relevant to contemporary attempts at reconceptualising divinity. In particular, he suggests that what the British idealist debate demonstrates is that broad metaphysical disagreements – such as whether ultimate reality or divinity is best characterised in personal or non-personal terms – may well turn on questions to do with the nature and purpose of human life. As Trakakis sees it, then, there is little hope of understanding, let along resolving, the metaphysical differences between Bosanquet and Pringle-Pattison, and likewise between orthodox and alternative forms of theism, without attending to concrete concerns about the value and destiny of finite individuals.