Defining normativity

Book chapter


Finlay, Stephen. (2019). Defining normativity. In In D. Plunkett, S. J. Shapiro and K. Toh (Ed.). Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence pp. 187 - 219 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190640408.003.0009
AuthorsFinlay, Stephen
EditorsD. Plunkett, S. J. Shapiro and K. Toh
Abstract

This chapter aims to clarify debate over the nature, existence, extension, and analyzability of normativity, by investigating whether different philosophers’ claims are about the same subject or (as argued by Derek Parfit) they are using the terms ‘normative’ and ‘normativity’ with different meanings. While it is suggested that the term may be multiply ambiguous, reasons are identified for optimism about a common subject-matter for metanormative theory. This is supported by sketching a special hybrid view of normative judgment, perspectivism, that occupies a position between cognitivism and noncognitivism, naturalism and nonnaturalism, objectivism and subjectivism. Three main fissures are explored: between (i) the “normativity” of language/thought versus that of facts and properties, (ii) abstract versus substantive normativity, and (iii) formal versus robust normativity.

Keywordsdefinition of normativity; cognitivism; noncognitivism; formal normativity; robust normativity; Derek Parfit; metanormative theory; perspectivism; hybrid theory
Page range187 - 219
Year2019
Book titleDimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence
PublisherOxford University Press
Place of publicationNew York, United States of America
ISBN9780190640408
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190640408.003.0009
Research GroupDianoia Institute of Philosophy
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