Quasi-expressivism about statements of law: A Hartian theory

Speech and thought about what the law is commonly function in practical ways to guide or assess behavior. These functions have often been seen as problematic for legal positivism in the tradition of H.L.A. Hart. One recent response is an expressivist analysis of legal statements. This paper advances a rival, positivist-friendly account of legal statements which the authors call “quasi-expressivist”. It combines a descriptivist, “rule-relational” semantics with a pragmatic account of the expressive and practical functions of legal discourse. This approach is at least as well-equipped as expressivism to explain the practical features of “internal” legal statements and a fundamental kind of legal disagreement, while handling better “external” legal statements. The chapter develops this theory in a Hartian framework, and also argues (against Kevin Toh’s expressivist interpretation) that Hart’s own views in The Concept of Law are best reconstructed along quasi-expressivist lines.