Ought of order

Book chapter


Finlay, Stephen. (2016). Ought of order. In In N. Charlow and M. Chrisman (Ed.). Deontic Modality pp. 169 - 199 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717928.001.0001
AuthorsFinlay, Stephen
EditorsN. Charlow and M. Chrisman
Abstract

Stephen Finlay argues in this chapter that Angelika Kratzer’s influential introduction of an ordering source parameter into the semantics for natural language modals was a mistake, at least for English normative modals such as ‘ought’. A simpler semantics in a dyadic framework, motivated by the need for a satisfactory treatment of instrumental (or ‘anankastic’) conditionals, also provides the resources for a better accommodation of gradability and ‘weak necessity’, information-sensitivity, and conflicts, with three moves: (i) an end-relational analysis of normative modality, (ii) an analysis of ‘ought’ or ‘weak necessity’ in terms of most, and (iii) an appeal to the same pragmatic resources utilized by Kratzer. The chapter ends with metasemantic observations about what we should want from a semantics for ‘ought’.

Keywordsdeontic modal; Angelika Kratzer; end-relational theory; weak necessity; probability; information sensitivity; anankastic conditional; hypothetical imperative
Page range169 - 199
Year2016
Book titleDeontic Modality
PublisherOxford University Press
Place of publicationOxford, United Kingdom
ISBN9780198717928
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717928.001.0001
Research GroupDianoia Institute of Philosophy
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