Groundless truth
Journal article
Baron, Sam, Miller, Kristie and Norton, James. (2014). Groundless truth. Inquiry. 57(2), pp. 175 - 195. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2013.855652
Authors | Baron, Sam, Miller, Kristie and Norton, James |
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Abstract | We defend two claims: (1) if one is attracted to a strong non-maximalist view about truthmaking, then it is natural to construe this as the view that there exist fundamental truths; (2) despite considerable aversion to fundamental truths, there is as yet no viable independent argument against them. That is, there is no argument against the existence of fundamental truths that is independent of any more specific arguments against the ontology accepted by the strong non-maximalist. Thus there is no argument that the strong non-maximalist herself will find dialectically motivating. |
Year | 2014 |
Journal | Inquiry |
Journal citation | 57 (2), pp. 175 - 195 |
Publisher | Routledge |
ISSN | 0020-174X |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2013.855652 |
Scopus EID | 2-s2.0-84893743434 |
Page range | 175 - 195 |
Research Group | Dianoia Institute of Philosophy |
Publisher's version | File Access Level Controlled |
Place of publication | United Kingdom |
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