Groundless truth

Journal article


Baron, Sam, Miller, Kristie and Norton, James. (2014) Groundless truth. Inquiry. 57(2), pp. 175 - 195. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2013.855652
AuthorsBaron, Sam, Miller, Kristie and Norton, James
Abstract

We defend two claims: (1) if one is attracted to a strong non-maximalist view about truthmaking, then it is natural to construe this as the view that there exist fundamental truths; (2) despite considerable aversion to fundamental truths, there is as yet no viable independent argument against them. That is, there is no argument against the existence of fundamental truths that is independent of any more specific arguments against the ontology accepted by the strong non-maximalist. Thus there is no argument that the strong non-maximalist herself will find dialectically motivating.

Year2014
JournalInquiry
Journal citation57 (2), pp. 175 - 195
PublisherRoutledge
ISSN0020-174X
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2013.855652
Scopus EID2-s2.0-84893743434
Page range175 - 195
Research GroupDianoia Institute of Philosophy
Place of publicationUnited Kingdom
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https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/86635/groundless-truth

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