Rational disagreement as a challenge to practical ethics and moral theory: An essay in moral epistemology
Book chapter
Audi, Robert. (2008). Rational disagreement as a challenge to practical ethics and moral theory: An essay in moral epistemology. In In Q. Smith (Ed.). Epistemology: New Essays pp. 225 - 247 Oxford Scholarship Online. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.003.0010
Authors | Audi, Robert |
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Editors | Q. Smith |
Abstract | Moral disagreement — roughly, disagreement about what is right or wrong — is widely considered to be both common and sufficiently resistant to rational resolution to constitute a challenge to the objectivity of ethics. This chapter distinguishes the kinds of disagreement in a way that is crucial for properly appraising both the extent and the epistemological significance of moral disagreement. It argues that certain kinds of disagreement are compatible not only with the objectivity of ethics but also with the self-evidence of a certain kind of moral principle. |
Keywords | moral disagreement; ethics; moral principles; dogmatism |
Page range | 225 - 247 |
Year | 2008 |
Book title | Epistemology: New Essays |
Publisher | Oxford Scholarship Online |
Place of publication | United Kingdom |
ISBN | 9780199264933 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.003.0010 |
Publisher's version | File Access Level Controlled |
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