Collectives' and individuals' obligations: A parity argument
Journal article
Collins, Stephanie and Lawford-Smith, Holly. (2016). Collectives' and individuals' obligations: A parity argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 46(1), pp. 38 - 58. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1116350
Authors | Collins, Stephanie and Lawford-Smith, Holly |
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Abstract | Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do. We argue for parity on both counts. |
Keywords | Collective obligation; collective responsibility; individual obligation; group agency; demandingness; promises; wrongdoing; benefit; beneficence; associative obligation |
Year | 2016 |
Journal | Canadian Journal of Philosophy |
Journal citation | 46 (1), pp. 38 - 58 |
Publisher | Taylor & Francis Australasia |
ISSN | 0045-5091 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1116350 |
Scopus EID | 2-s2.0-84948750886 |
Page range | 38 - 58 |
Research Group | Dianoia Institute of Philosophy |
Publisher's version | File Access Level Controlled |
Place of publication | United Kingdom |
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