How infallibilists can have it all

Journal article


Climenhaga, Nevin. (2023). How infallibilists can have it all. Monist: an international quarterly of general philosophical inquiry. 106(4), pp. 363-380. https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onad020
AuthorsClimenhaga, Nevin
Abstract

I advance a novel argument for an infallibilist theory of knowledge, according to which we know all and only those propositions that are certain for us. I argue that this theory lets us reconcile major extant theories of knowledge, in the following sense: for any of these theories, if we require that its central condition (evidential support, reliability, safety, etc.) obtains to a maximal degree, we get a theory of knowledge extensionally equivalent to infallibilism. As such, the infallibilist can affirm that, when their conditions are suitably interpreted, most post-Gettier theories of knowledge offer necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. The infallibilist can thus reconcile major theories of knowledge, and is in a better position to explain the intuitive appeal of these theories than the fallibilist who only accepts one of them, and rejects the rest.

Keywordsinfallibilist theory of knowledge
Year01 Jan 2023
JournalMonist: an international quarterly of general philosophical inquiry
Journal citation106 (4), pp. 363-380
PublisherOxford University Press
ISSN0026-9662
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onad020
Web address (URL)https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/106/4/363/7319399
Open accessOpen access
Research or scholarlyResearch
Page range363-380
Publisher's version
License
File Access Level
Open
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online17 Oct 2023
Publication process dates
Accepted2023
Deposited05 Jul 2024
Additional information

© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Monist

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact journals.permissions@oup.com

Place of publicationUnited States
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