Metaphysical analyticity and the epistemology of logic
Journal article
Russell, Gillian K.. (2014). Metaphysical analyticity and the epistemology of logic. Philosophical Studies. 171(1), pp. 161 - 175. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0255-y
Authors | Russell, Gillian K. |
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Abstract | Recent work on analyticity distinguishes two kinds, metaphysical and epistemic. This paper argues that the distinction allows for a new view in the philosophy of logic according to which the claims of logic are metaphysically analytic and have distinctive modal profiles, even though their epistemology is holist and in many ways rather Quinean. It is argued that such a view combines some of the more attractive aspects of the Carnapian and Quinean approaches to logic, whilst avoiding some famous problems. |
Keywords | epistemology of logic; metaphysical analyticity; truth in virtue of meaning; two dogmas; web of belief; regress argument |
Year | 2014 |
Journal | Philosophical Studies |
Journal citation | 171 (1), pp. 161 - 175 |
Publisher | Springer Netherlands |
ISSN | 0031-8116 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0255-y |
Page range | 161 - 175 |
Research Group | Dianoia Institute of Philosophy |
Publisher's version | File Access Level Controlled |
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https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/8932v/metaphysical-analyticity-and-the-epistemology-of-logic
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