Subordinating speech and speaking up

Book chapter

Russell, Gillian. (2019). Subordinating speech and speaking up. In In E. Lepore and D. Sosa (Ed.). Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Language; Volume 1 pp. 178 - 207 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198836568.001.0001
AuthorsRussell, Gillian
EditorsE. Lepore and D. Sosa
Abstract

When we encounter speech that denigrates others unjustly, we sometimes feel a desire and an obligation to respond with more speech—a response that this paper calls ‘speaking up’. Even so, it is also common to have doubts about the value of speaking up. The paper exploits Stalnaker’s notion of a Context Set and Lewis’s work on Accommodation to further develop a model of subordinating speech that has been taking shape in the literature on pornography and hate speech. It then uses that model to suggest five ways in which speaking up can make a difference—while also noting that the model suggests that the effectiveness of speaking up can be limited by certain aspects of the context.

Keywordssubordinating speech; presupposition; accommodation; speech acts; context; ranking; permissions; speaking up
Page range178 - 207
Year2019
Book titleOxford Studies in Philosophy of Language; Volume 1
PublisherOxford University Press
Place of publicationOxford, United Kingdom
ISBN9780198836568
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198836568.001.0001
Research GroupDianoia Institute of Philosophy
Publisher's version
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Controlled
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