Being somehow without (Possibly) being something

Journal article

Fritz, Peter Anselm. (2023). Being somehow without (Possibly) being something. Mind. 132(526), pp. 348-371. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac052
AuthorsFritz, Peter Anselm
Abstract

Contingentists—who hold that it is contingent what there is—are divided on the claim that having a property or standing in a relation requires being something. This claim can be formulated as a natural schematic principle of higher-order modal logic. On this formulation, I argue that contingentists who are also higher-order contingentists—and so hold that it is contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are—should reject the claim. Moreover, I argue that given higher-order contingentism, having a property or standing in a relation does not even require possibly being something.

KeywordsArts and Humanities; Epistemology; Metaphysics; Philosophy; Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic; Philosophy of Mind
Year01 Jan 2023
JournalMind
Journal citation132 (526), pp. 348-371
PublisherOxford University Press
ISSN0026-4423
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac052
Web address (URL)https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/132/526/348/7082022
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Open
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online21 Mar 2023
Publication process dates
Completed21 Mar 2023
Deposited03 Sep 2023
Additional information

© Fritz 2023

Place of publicationUnited Kingdom
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