Being somehow without (Possibly) being something
Journal article
Fritz, Peter Anselm. (2023). Being somehow without (Possibly) being something. Mind. 132(526), pp. 348-371. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac052
Authors | Fritz, Peter Anselm |
---|---|
Abstract | Contingentists—who hold that it is contingent what there is—are divided on the claim that having a property or standing in a relation requires being something. This claim can be formulated as a natural schematic principle of higher-order modal logic. On this formulation, I argue that contingentists who are also higher-order contingentists—and so hold that it is contingent what propositions, properties and relations there are—should reject the claim. Moreover, I argue that given higher-order contingentism, having a property or standing in a relation does not even require possibly being something. |
Keywords | Arts and Humanities; Epistemology; Metaphysics; Philosophy; Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic; Philosophy of Mind |
Year | 01 Jan 2023 |
Journal | Mind |
Journal citation | 132 (526), pp. 348-371 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
ISSN | 0026-4423 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac052 |
Web address (URL) | https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/132/526/348/7082022 |
Publisher's version | License File Access Level Open |
Output status | Published |
Publication dates | |
Online | 21 Mar 2023 |
Publication process dates | |
Completed | 21 Mar 2023 |
Deposited | 03 Sep 2023 |
Additional information | © Fritz 2023 |
Place of publication | United Kingdom |
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Franz_2023_Being_somehow_without_possibly_being_something.pdf | |
License: CC BY-NC-ND | |
File access level: Open |
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