Who cares what you accurately believe?
Journal article
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2015). Who cares what you accurately believe? Philosophical Perspectives. 29(1), pp. 217-248. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12064
Authors | Littlejohn, Clayton |
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Abstract | [Extract] In this paper, I want to look at a consequentialist approach to epistemic norms because it seems to give us the resources needed to solve our two problems about rational belief. Starting from the assumption that accuracy or truth is an epistemic good that calls for promotion, we can use norms from decision-theory to vindicate probabilism.4 It seems we can explain why rational beliefs form pretty patterns without assigning any independent value to these beliefs’ aesthetic properties. Moreover, we can use these same resources to explain why rational believers ought to tolerate certain kinds of inconsistency.5 If the accuracy-first framework really does help us get a handle on these problems, it would have an undeniable appeal. |
Year | 2015 |
Journal | Philosophical Perspectives |
Journal citation | 29 (1), pp. 217-248 |
Publisher | Blackwell Publishing |
ISSN | 1520-8583 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12064 |
Scopus EID | 2-s2.0-84964335220 |
Page range | 217-248 |
Publisher's version | License All rights reserved File Access Level Controlled |
Output status | Published |
Publication dates | |
Online | 22 Apr 2016 |
Publication process dates | |
Deposited | 24 Oct 2022 |
https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/8y5zy/who-cares-what-you-accurately-believe
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